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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J:<'AIRFIELD IRRIGATION
COMPANY, et al,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
vs.
M. KENNETH WHITE and
RALPH M. SMITH,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
12817

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant Fairfield is the owner of the right to
use all" of the water issuing from the Fairfield Springs
near Fairfield, Utah. Respondent White owns large irrigation wells located near the springs. When Respondent's
wells are pumped, they interfere with (reduce) the flow
of the Fairfield Springs. Plaintiff's ownership of the Fairfield Springs and the relationship between the springs and
respondent's wells were adjudicated by a decree entered
by the District Court of Utah County on June 1, 1965.
Defendant White appealed from that decree, but it was
affirmed. Fairfield Irrigation Co. v. White, et al, 18 Ut. 2d
93, 416 P. 2d 641.
11

This proceeding was initiated by Fairfield's petition
for an order to show cause. Fairfield asserted that Respond.
ent was operating his wells without replacing water to the
spring area, and that this violated Fairfield's rights as
adjudicated in the 1965 decree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
An order to show cause issued, and a hearing was
held thereon on October 30, 1970. On January 28, 1972,
the court entered its order dismissing the petition. Appel.
lant requested entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, but none was entered. (R. 17) The court did, how·
ever, in its order dismissing the petition, make a conclusionary finding that Respondent "did not violate the provisions of" the 1965 decree. (R. 16).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have this court determine that the
manner in which the Respondent is operating his wells
violates the rights of the Appellant as fixed by the 1965
Decree.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While the trial court did not enter any findings of
fact or conclusions of law, and we, therefore, cannot direct
our comments to the court's findings, we do not believe
that there is any material dispute in the evidence.
As we shall presently note in detail, the trial court,
in 1965, expressly found in its Finding No. 1 (R. 3) and
expressly decreed in paragraph 1 of the decree (R. 4) that
2

Appellant Fairfield was the owner of the right to use "all"
of the water issuing from the Fairfield Springs. The court
also found in Finding No. 13 and decreed in Paragraph 3
of the decree, that the Respondent's irrigation wells and
the Fairfield Springs are interconnected, and that the
pumping of the irrigation wells "directly and immediately
causes the flow of water from the Fairfield Springs to reduce in flow." (para. 3 of the decree)
In 1964 Respondent White drilled a replacement well
near the springs for the purpose of replacing water "which
was otherwise being taken from the Fairfield Springs by
the pumping of defendant White's wells." The court found
that this replacement well is also "directly connected to
the spring, and when it is pumped, the flow of the spring
decreases." (Finding No. 14) The amount flowing from
the Fairfield Springs is not constant, even if it were not disturbed by Respondent's pumping, and thus the court in
Finding No. 2, entered in 1965, found:

" ... the flow of water from the Fairfield Springs
varied from a low of 4.10 c.f.s. to a high of 6 c.f.s.,
plus the quantity of water which has flowed through
a one-inch hole in the headgate located one foot below
the water surface, and also plus the water utilized
through a four-inch pipeline to supply domestic water
for the homes in Fairfield." (Finding No. 2)
As we will note in more detail below, Respondent
White appealed from this 1965 decision, but it was affirmed.

Since the evidence shows, without dispute, that Re.
spondent White has pumped one of his wells hundreds of
hours, and that he has not operated his replacement well
at all. The replacement well leaks 0.12 c.f.s. of water into
the plaintiff's ditches, but other than for this leak there
has been no replacement. The evidence in regard to thii
matter is found in Respondent's answers to lnterrogatoriei.
(R. 12) Answer 1 shows the hours each month, that Re.
spondent White has operated one of his irrigation wells
'
and then in answer to question No. 2, he states that the re.
placement well "has not been pumped, but has flowed .12
c.f.s." into plaintiff's ditches. (R. 12)
The yield of the spring has been periodically meas·
ured since 1967, and the measurements are shown in Ex.
1 (Tr. 13). An engineer, Mr. George A. Lawrence, then
platted these measurements on graphs (Tr. 19) (Ex. 2-5).
Ex. 2 consists of six sheets, and shows in graph form the
periodic measurements from January 15, 1967, until about
August 10, 1970, which is shortly before the hearing.
We will not here endeavor to note all of the measure·
ments for all of the years. We think we can get to the crux
of the matter by looking at the irrigation season of 1969.
This is shown on Ex. 3. Across the bottom of Ex. 3 are the
number of hours that Mr. White said in his answers to
interrogatories he pumped during each month. Thus, he
started to pump at 11: 30 a.m. on April 30th, and pumped
641 hours to May 30th. He did not pump in June. He
pumped 370 hours in July, 569 hours in August, 612 hour'.
in September, and 70 hours in October. As a matter ot
mathematics, there are only 720 hours in a 30-day month,
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and thus during the irrigation s<:ason of 1969, the evidence,
without dispute, shows that he pumped one well a majority of the time. The trial court found in 1965 that Mr.
White has equipped his two irrigation wells to permit him
to draw 5 c.f.s. from each well. (Finding No. 10.)
Ex. 3 shows that on April 30, 1969, when according
to Mr. White's answers to interrogatories, he started to
pump (R. 12) the springs were yielding 4.8 c.f.s. plus the
0.12 d.s. leaking from the replacement well. During the
month of May, Mr. White pumped 641 hours, which
would be more than 26 full (24-hour) days, and the measurements shown on the graph indicate that the spring was
pulled down below 3.9 c.f.s. on June 26th (plus the 0.12
leaking from the replacement well). The measuring deYices there are not so precise (Tr. 29-31) that we would
contend for a technical violation of the decree in regard
to a flow of 4.1 c.f .s., which is the minimum amount specified in the replacement order. (Par. 4 of the decree) What
we do want to spotlight here is the fact that the spring plus
the leakage from the replacement well, was nearly 5 c.f.s.
when Mr. White turned on his pump on April 30, 1969,
and the springs dropped in flow to or below their 4.1 c.f.s.
minimum historic low flow, as found by the trial court, in
1965. Mr. White then shut off his pump, and did not pump
at all in June. The springs gradually increased in flow,
to more than 5 c.f.s. by the end of June. (Ex. 3) There are
fluctuations up and down shown on the graph during the
month of June, but when the water is changed from Fairfield's south ditch to its north ditch and back again, a problem exists in getting an accurate measurement. There is a
pond which covers the spring area, and since the ditches

5

are different in cle, ation, then~ is alw1ys the possibi!i~·
in switching the wc:.ter from one ditch to another th,
atwater is either being impounded in the pond (and thus
less than all the water is being measured) or water is bein
. hd rawn f rom storage (and thus the measurementsg 1.<7·1
wit
might reflect more than actual yield). (Tr. 30) It, never. ~;
theless, is clear that the springs were producing (with the ::
leak from the replacement well) 5 c.f .s. of water on April "
e.
30, 1969. Mr. White then pumped for 641 hours, and the '
6.
flow of the spring dropped either to or below 4.1 c.f.s. He e
quit pumping, and the spring steadily increased in flow to :
!
more than 5 c.f .s.

We won't at this point dwell on the evidence on interference, because the trial court adjudicated in 1965 that
the springs and Mr. White's wells produce water from the
same source and that when his wells are pumped, the flow ,
of the spring directly and immediately reduces. See para·
graph 3 of the decree and paragraph 13 of the findings. It
is thus adjudicated that while he was pumping his well
641 hours, he was taking water from the springs, and the
graph simply confirms this. For the convenience of the .'
court, we reproduce this part of the graph, and submit that
the evidence conclusively shows that the water represented
by the shaded part of the graph is water which the spring
would naturally have yielded, but which Mr. White took
by pumping his wells.
This poses the first question: When the spring is na·
urally flowing substantially in excess of its historic mini·
mum flow of 4.1 c.f.s., can Mr. White at his sole discretion
turn on his pumps and take the excess above 4.1 in a
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critical growing month, like the month of June, and then
have it replaced later on in the season, either through the
natural yield of the spring itself of by operating his replacement facilities? We assert that replacement should
be at the same time. If he takes 1 c.f .s. of our water on the
16th day of June, he should replace it on the 16th day of
June, and not in October.
The evidence also conclusively shows that throughout the irrigation season of 1969, Mr. White pumped one
well a total of 2262 hours. (Answers to Interrogatories,
R. 12) The irrigation season is 183 days long. (See Finding
1) By dividing 24 hours into the total hours pumped, it is
apparent that he pumped his well the equivalent of 94
days out of the 183-day season. By the end of the season,
Ex. 6 shows that the spring had, nevertheless, yielded 1786
acre feet. Since he didn't pump his replacement well at all,
it is obvious that but for his pumping, the total yield of the
spring would have been very substantially higher. We
cannot know how much, because while he is pumping, the
equilibrium of the basin is destroyed, and as the Supreme
Court noted in its opinion affirming the 1965 decree, it is
impossible while he is pumping to determine with cer·
tainty what the springs would have yielded. (18 Ut. 2d
93, 98.)
This poses the second quesion: When it is clear, as
we think the evidence is here, that the spring would yield
substantially more water than 1600 acre feet, if Mr. White
did not pump, can he, under a decree which awards to us
all the water of the spring take all of the excess above 1600
acre feet and make no replacement at all?

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS OF THE FINDINGS AND DECREE NEED TO BE CONSTRUED
TOGETHER AS A HARMONIOUS WHOLE.
The findings, the decree entered in 1965 and the Supreme Court's opinion affirming them are in the file. For
the convenience of the court, we next set forth some of the
parts thereof which we think relate to the problem be-

fore us.
Finding No. 1 finds that the appellant has appropriated 11all" of the water from the springs. It describes the
winter rights, the livestock watering rights and the domestic rights. The material part is as follows:
"1. That through usage prior to 1903, the predecessors in interest of the Fairfield Irrigation Company have appropriated and acquired the right to use
for irrigation, livestock watering and domestic purposes all of the water flowing from the Fairfield
Springs and spring area located immediately west
from the Town of Fairfield, State of Utah. . . . "
(Finding No. 1, R. 3)

Finding No. 2 is the finding about the yield of the
spring in cubic feet per second and is as follows:
"2. That prior to the drilling of large irrigation
wells by the defendant M. Kenneth White . . . the
flow of water from the Fairfield Springs varied from
a low of 4.10 c.f .s. to a high of 6 c.f .s., plus the quantity of water, which has flowed through a one-inch
hole in the headgate located one foot below the water
surface, and also plus the water utilized through a
four-inch pipeline to supply domestic water for the
homes in Fairfield .... " (Finding No. 2 R. 131)

9

The court then makes some findings as to how 111an
1
acre feet the springs would yield at particular flows , anuJ
states that a flow of 4.1 c.f.s. would produce more than
1400 feet per season, a flow of 4.5 c.f.s. would produce
more than 1600 acre feet per season, and that a flow of
5 c.f.s. would produce more than 1800 acre feet per sea.
son, in addition to the town supply and livestock water
through the one-inch hole.
The court then in the next several findings, finds that
several of the individual plaintiffs were the owners of in.
dividual wells, and makes findings concerning the domestic springs.

In Finding No. 9 the court finds that the defendant
White drilled two wells, one for 4 c.f.s. and one for 5 c.f.s.;
that he equipped the wells with pumps and that on Au·
gust 27, 1964, appellant was producing 10 c.f.s. from the
two irrigation wells, plus a stock watering well. The court
found that each well has been equipped to permit Mr.
White to draw 5 c.f.s. from it. (Finding No. 10)
The court then found (R. 135, 136):
"13. That when the defendant M. Kenneth
White commenced pumping his two large irrigation
wells in 1962, the pumping caused the flow of the
Fairfield Springs to drop. That when the White wells
were turned off toward the end of July, 1962, the
flow of the spring started in increase, and in 1963,
under a program of testing undertaken by the State
Engineer's office the White irrigation wells were kept
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off until a date near the middle of July. That both
wells were then turned on, and again it was demonstrated that the wells immediately caused the flow of
water from the Fairfield Springs to decrease substantially. The wells were shut off, and the flow from the
springs again increased. The same direct connection
was again demonstrated through the pumping of Mr.
White's wells in October of 1963, and throughout
the season of 1964."
"14. That in 1964 the defendant M. Kenneth
White, with permission from the State Engineer,
drilled a replacement well for the purpose of replacing water which was otherwise being taken from
the Fairfield Springs by the pumping of defendant
White's wells. That said replacement well is also directly connected to the spring, and when it is pumped,
the flow of the spring decreases."
In Finding No. 16 the court found that by reason of

the pumping of the wells by the appellant in 1964,
". . . the flow of the Fairfield Springs dropped
substantially. That an effort was made to replace the
water which was taken from the springs by defendant
White's pumping, but the total yield of water from
both the replacement well and the springs totalled
only about 960 acre feet, whereas, the natural flow of
the springs prior to the drilling of the large irrigation
wells during the irrigation season would have varied
between 1,400 and 1,700 acre feet.... " (R. 136)
The court found (Finding 17 ,) that as a direct result
of the pumping by the appellant the particular Fairfield
spring from which the town got its water supply was
caused to go dry.
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After thus expressly finding that appellant owned
"all" of the water issuing from Fairfield Springs, and that
the pumping by respondent of his wells directly interfered
with the springs, the court then entered its Finding No.
26 as follows:
"26. That the defendant White should also be
enjoined from pumping his two large irrigation wells
at any time or during any season, except upon the condition that the water of the plaintiffs be fully replaced, with the same quality of water, with the same
quantity of water, and at the same point where each
of the plaintiffs now gets his water. That said replacement order should specifically require (Emphasis
added)
"(a) That the irrigation water from Fairfield
Springs be maintained at minimum flow of 4.10 cubic
feet per second through April 20th to October 20th of
each year, and that the average flow be such as to
yield not less than 1600 acre feet during said season,
and that at least 4.5 c.f .s. be maintained therein during the approximately 90 days when the ground is
not frozen between October 20th and April 20th.
"(c) That the town water pipeline have water
replaced in it equal to the quantity it would yield
or convey with a head of 18 inches of water above the
top of the existing four inch line. That said water
is in addition to the irrigation water.
"(d) that sufficient additional water beyond the
one-inch hole placed through the headgate be added
to the natural channel to provide livestock water
in the fields of all the plaintiffs which abut said
channel. That said water shall be in addition to the
irrigation and domestic water." (R. 141, 142)
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Finding No. 29 then provides:
"That if the White wells, including the replacement well, are pumped in the future to the extent
they have been pumped in 1962, 1963 and 1964, there
will be further reduction of ground water pressures
and the flow of the spring will be further reduced."
(R. 143)
The decree expressly confirmed the ownership of
Fairfield to all of the waters issuing from Fairfield Spring.
The language of paragraph 1 of the decree is in part as
follows:
"1. That the plaintiff Fairfield Irrigation Company is the owner, through a diligence appropriation,
of the right to use, for the purposes noted below,
all of the waters issuing from the Fairfield Springs
area located immediately west from the town of Fairfield, and that said water has been since prior to 1903
used beneficially for irrigation, livestock watering
and domestic use ... "
Then follows specific findings about the livestock
water, the winter use and the domestic use which are not
presently involved. Paragraph 2 of the decree deals with
individual wells of individual plaintiffs which are not
here involved.
Paragraph 3 of the decree provides:
"That the pumping of the three wells owned by
the defendant M. Kenneth White ... produces water
from the same source and directly and immediately
causes the flow of the water from the Fairfield
Springs to reduce in flow .... "
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After thus expressly finding that appellant owned
"all" of the water issuing from Fairfield Springs, and that
the pumping by respondent of his wells directly interfered
with the springs, the court then entered its Finding No.
26 as follows:
"26. That the defendant White should also be
enjoined from pumping his two large irrigation wells
at any time or during any season, except upon the condition that the water of the plaintiffs be fully re.
placed, with the same quality of water, with the same
quantity of water, and at the same point where each
of the plaintiffs now gets his water. That said replacement order should specifically require (Emphasis
added)
"(a) That the irrigation water from Fairfield
Springs be maintained at minimum flow of 4.10 cubic
feet per second through April 20th to October 20th of
each year, and that the average flow be such as to
yield not less than 1600 acre feet during said season,
and that at least 4.5 c.f.s. be maintained therein dur·
ing the approximately 90 days when the ground is
not frozen between October 20th and April 20th.
"(c) That the town water pipeline have water
replaced in it equal to the quantity it would yield
or convey with a head of 18 inches of water above the
top of the existing four inch line. That said water
is in addition to the irrigation water.
"(d) that sufficient additional water beyond the
one-inch hole placed through the headgate be added
to the natural channel to provide livestock wat~r
in the fields of all the plaintiffs which abut said
channel. That said water shall be in addition to the
irrigation and domestic water." (R. 141, 142)

12

Finding No. 29 then provides:
"That if the White wells, including the replacement well, are pumped in the future to the extent
they have been pumped in 1962, 1963 and 1964, there
will be further reduction of ground water pressures
and the flow of the spring will be further reduced."
(R. 143)
The decree expressly confirmed the ownership of
Fairfield to all of the waters issuing from Fairfield Spring.
The language of paragraph 1 of the decree is in part as
foIIows:
"J. That the plaintiff Fairfield Irrigation Company is the owner, through a diligence appropriation,
of the right to use, for the purposes noted below,
all of the waters issuing from the Fairfield Springs
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Then follows specific findings about the livestock
water, the winter use and the domestic use which are not
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individual wells of individual plaintiffs which are not
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Paragraph 3 of the decree provides:
"That the pumping of the three wells owned by
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from the same source and directly and immediately
causes the flow of the water from the Fairfield
Springs to reduce in flow .... "
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Paragraph 4 of the decree then enters the replacement
order, which is quoted above in Finding 26, but the de.
cree does not repeat part of the language of Finding 26
which found that White should be enjoined from pumping
his two large irrigation wells ''at any time, or during any
season.", except upon condition that "the water of the
plaintiffs be fully replaced ... with the same quantity of
water" at the same points where each of the plaintiffs now
gets his water. The decree does contain the specific provisions of subparagraph (a) and (e) of Finding 26.
It is our position that subparagraphs (a) through (e)
were not intended to give Mr. White any interest in the
Fairfield Springs, nor to amend, subtract from, or limit the
specific adjudication that Fairfield is the owner of 11all"
the water from the Fairfield Springs. It has been argued by
Respondent that the 1600 acre feet figure in the replace·
ment order was intended to be a finding of the amount of
water Fairfield could beneficially use. However, Paragraph
1 of the decree expressly adjudicates that Fairfield has
since prior to 1903 benefically used all of the water from
the springs. There is no finding that the springs only yield
1600 acre feet, but as noted above, the court recited what
the spring would yield if the flow were at different levels,
and expressly in that finding refrained from any conclusion
as to the springs' total flow. This method of handling the
matter was vigorously challenged by Mr. White when he
appealed from that decision, and in response we argued
that there was evidence which would show that the spring
would haveyieldedmore than 2400acrefeet in 1963. Spe·
cifically, one of the farmers who had used the entire flow
14

-during his turn on the same piece of land for many, many
years, had testified that during 1963, when the spring
yielded about 1237 acre feet (reduced because of Mr.
White's pumping,) the stream was only about one-half of
the quantity he had received in past years. In any event,
the court didn't find in Finding No. 2 that the maximum
yield of the spring was 1600 acre feet, and it didn't find
that Fairfield could only use 1600 acre feet beneficially.
What it did do was find and adjudicate that Fairfield had
appropriated all of the water from the springs and that
since prior to 1903 it had beneficially used all of the water
from springs. It found that the flow of the spring varied
from a low of 4.1 c.f .s. to a high of 6 c.f.s., and that a
flow of 5 c.f.s. would yield 1800 acre feet per year. It simply awarded Fairfield all the water. It found that when
Mr. White pumps his well, it immediately reduces the flow
from the springs. It then made a general finding about the
duty to replace. This finding is No. 26, and it expressly
says that Mr. White should be enjoined from pumping:
"at any time or during any season, except upon
condition that the water of the plaintiffs (which had
been adjudicated to be all the water from the springs)
be fully replaced with . . . the same quantity of
water."
We think this language prohibits Mr. White from
taking the water in June and replacing it in October, and
we think it also prohibits him from taking our water at
any time or in any season without replacing it. If the subparagraphs which then follow were read entirely by themselves, and the specific findings and the specific decree
provisions noted above are disregarded, it appears that

15

Mr. White has no duty, except not to reduce our sprin s
below their historic minimum flow (4.1 c.f.s.). and th:t
he can have all the water from the spring above 1600 acre
feet, but to so interpret these subparagraphs ignores the
very heart of the problem which caused the litigation.
We had a very lengthy trial, and the trial was con.
cerned with the extent of Fairfield's water rights, and with
the problem of whether the wells interfered with the
springs. While Fairfield was put to proof about its diligence appropriation, there was never a serious dispute
about the fact that historically all of the water had been
used. The court so decreed, and then expressly decreed that
it had been beneficially used. The big problem was to try
to prove what the spring in its natural condition has yielded. There were not very many measurements taken before
the equilibrium of the basin was destroyed by the drilling
of wells. As the briefs in the previous appeal show, we
used many types of evidence. We had the testimony of the
individual farmers about the flow and yield of the spring.
We had isolated measurements over a rather long period
of years. We had an observation well maintained by the
U.S.G.S., and the yield of the spring could be correlated
with the elevation of water in the observation well, etc.,
and after what we remember as being about a twelve-day
trial, the court found that the spring had never been below
4.1 c.f.s. before the equilibrium of the basin had been
desroyed by drilling. It also found that the springs some·
times yielded as much as 6 c.f .s. It refused to find in Find·
ing No. 2 specifically what the spring would yield in acre
feet, but merely set forth a finding as to the acre feet which
would be yielded by particular flows. It awarded Fairfield
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all the water from the springs. It found that Fairfield had
ber..eficially used all the water from the springs. It found
that the wells interfered with the spring, and it found expressly that Mr. White should not be permitted to pump
at any time or during any season, excepilliJ.pon condition
that the plaintiffs' water be fully replaced with the same
quantity of water.
The evidence here conclusively shows that he simply
turns his wells on at his own discretion when the flow of
the spring is greater than its historic minimum of 4.1 c.f .s.
He has discovered that he can produce his well hundreds
of hours without reducing the spring below 4.1 c.f .s., and
then if he shuts off periodically the spring itself in the
water years we have had since 1967, produces enough
water to bring the total up to 1600 acre feet by
October 20th. He thus takes much of the water which the
spring would have yielded to us, and which we have historically had, in the critical months, and he asserts the
right to take all of the spring water in excess of 1600 acre
feet. The more than 2200 hours that he pumped his 5 c.f .s.
well in 1969 assuredly took substantial amounts of spring
water, which the court has adjudicated belongs to us, and
he has made no replacement at all.

POINT II
IN CONSTRUING THE DECREE, IT SHOULD BE
CONSTRUED TOGETHER AS A WHOLE SO AS TO
GIVE MEANING AND FORCE TO ALL OF ITS
TERMS.
The Utah cases uniformly hold that in construing a
decree, it should be construed together as a whole, so as
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to give meaning and force to all of its terms. It is also
proper to look to the findings of fact which support the
decree.
One case which is similar on its facts is Ophir Creek
Water Co. v. Ophir Hill Consol. Mining Co. et al, 61 Ut.
5 51, 216 P. 490 (192 3). In that case the decree awarded to
Ophir Creek Water Co. "all of the waters of Ophir Creek."
The defendant operated a power plant, which during high
water took part of the water into its pipeline and during
low water took all of the water into the line. The trial
court had ruled that whenever there is an overflow at the
head of the pipe, "'that is to say, whenever the entire flow
of Ophir Creek" at the intake of the pipe is not being taken
into the pipeline, then in the operation of its said power
house, the defendant shall use for the delivery of water
• from the pipeline upon its water wheel a "nozzle with a
discharge opening of 2% inches in diameter, and shall at
all times while such overflow continues, permit at least
7.5 c.f.s. to flow out of the pipe into the channel."
The case got back into court on an order to show
cause why defendant should not be held in contempt. The
defendant took the position that it had always complied
with the decree in regard to a 2% inch nozzle for the discharge of the water "just as the decree provides, and that
was the measure of its duty under the decree."
In upholding the award of "all of the water of Ophir
Creek" to the plaintiff irrigation company, and in holding
that the defendant didn't meet his total duty by complying
with the express provisions of the decree in regard to a
2% inch nozzle, the court said:
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"We have seen in the last-quoted paragraph of
the decree, above set forth, that the water awarded
plaintiff, as therein stated, is necessary and essential
for plaintiff's use. It is manifest, therefore, that the
purpose and object of the action was to specifically
determine the rights of each of the parties, especially
of the plaintiff to a specific quantity of water, and to
quiet the title thereto. The quantity of water that each
was entitled to was the principal thing to be determined. The method or means of discharging the water
was of secondary importance. It is reasonably clear to
the mind of the court that it was intended by the decree that appellant should permit 7 .5 second feet of
water to be discharged from its pipeline and returned
to the stream whenever the water was not all taken
into the pipe and there was an overflow at the head."
In other words, the court had found in its earlier decree that the irrigation company was the owner of all of
the water from Ophir Creek. During low water, the entire
creek flow could be taken into the pipeline, but during
high water, the pipe wouldn't hold all of the water. In
order to regulate the use of the water by the defendant for
power, and to honor the decreed right of the plaintiff,
the court had provided for a discharge of water through a
2Ys inch nozzle, and the power company had complied
strictly with the discharge through a nozzle of this size,
but the plaintiff was not getting the water to which it was
entitled, and the court said that it is manifest that the purpose of the action was to determine the water rights of
each of the parties. The quantity of water that each was
entitled to was the principal thing to be determined. The
decreed method or means of discharging the water was of
secondary importance, and would not be controlling.
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Another case holding that it is necessary in the con.
struction of a decree to construe the decree as a whole, tak.
ing into account all of the clauses, and to make them har.
monious, one with the other, if this can be done, is Salt
Lake City v. Telluride Power Co., 82 Ut. 607, 17 P. 2d
281 (1932). Here again the court was being called upon
to construe an earlier decree entered in 1901, and a sup.
plemental decree made in 1912. The Supreme Court said
that to determine the issues raised by the current appeal,
" ... it is necessary to construe and interpret the
decree of 1912 . . . . In construing the decree it is
proper to refer to the pleadings in the case and the
issues joined thereunder, in order to explain and limit
the language used in the decree."
The court also said that in construing the decree, it
should be construed together as a whole, so as to give
meaning and force to all of its terms, and
"In construing the decree, it should be construed
together as a whole, so as to give meaning and force
to all of its terms, and if a reasonable construction
can be had which will give force to all of its wording,
such a construction should be made. 23 Cyc. 1101.
This being so, the only way to give effect to the
words 'pumped water' would be to construe the two
paragraphs together.''
To the same effect is the more recent case of Hubble
v. Cache County Drainage District, 123 Ut. 405, 259 P. 2d
893. Again the court was construing an earlier decree.
The court quoted from the earlier decree, and said that it
was necessary to consider the entire decree. It gave particu·
lar interpretation of it, and said, to hold otherwise "would
treat as surplusage the word "improvements'". The court
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then cited Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Co., supra,
in support of the proposition that in construing the decree, it should be construed together as a whole, so as
to give meaning and force to all of its terms, and if a
reasonable construction can be had which will give force
to all of its words, such a construction should be made.
In Huber v. Newman, 106 Ut. 363, 145 P. 2d 780, the

wording of the judgment, when read by itself, suggested
that the defendant had to post a bond, without regard to
whether plaintiff posted one. The conclusions of law, however, clearly indicated that defendant should post his bond,
only "after" the court's approval of the plaintiff's bond.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the court held that it was
necessary to read the conclusions of law and judgment together. The court said:
"While the wording in the judgment might suggest that the defendant . . . was required to post an
indemnity bond . . . whether plaintiffs had posted
their bond ... the conclusions of law clearly reveal
that such is not the purpose or effect of the language
used ... The judgment must be construed in the light
of the conclusions and must be read and given effect
as indicated in the language ... "of the conclusions.
The court has on a number of occasions also held
that a decree awarding "all of the water of a spring" is
clear, definite and unambiguous. In Gianulakis v. Sharp,
71 Ut. 528, 267 P. 1017 (1928), the parties had had a
previous suit of the same name reported in 63 Ut. 255 P.
373 0922). The parties agreed that the trial court should
first determine whether that previous action was res adjudicata. The pleadings, findings of fact, conclusions of
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law, decree and opinion of the Supreme Court affirming
the decree, were all offered and received in evidence. The
trial court then announced that he thought the issue had
been adjudicated. On appeal to the Supreme Court in 1928
one of the contentions was that the former decree entered
in 1922, which awarded to one of the parties all of the
water from certain springs was void, for uncertainty. The
findings recited that there were a number of springs,
known as Big Springs, the East Springs and other unnamed
springs located on the described land, and that for more
than twenty years the plaintiff's predecessor in interest had
diverted and used "all of the flow of water from each and
all of said springs." The decree then provided that the de·
fendant Sharp:
" ... is the owner and entitled to the use of all
of the waters flowing from those certain springs
known as Big Springs, East Springs and other un·
named springs.''
The Supreme Court, at page 533 of the Utah Reports,
said that there is nothing uncertain about the award of all
the water from the springs to the plaintiff. It quiets plain·
tiff's title to all of the water flowing from the springs, and
enjoins the defendant in that suit from taking any of the
water of the springs. Then the court said:
" ... Nothing can be more certain than to decree
all of the water flowing from certain designated
springs to one party and perpetually enjoining ~he
other party from taking any of the water flowwg
from such springs. This court has so held in the cases
of Elmer v. McCune, 29 Utah 320, 81 P. 159; Ande~·
son v. Hamson, 50 Utah 151, 167 P. 254. Nor ca~ tt
be said that the decree is uncertain as to the period
22
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when Sharp is entitled to the use of all the water
flowing from the springs. All of the waters flowing
from the springs cannot well be considered to mean
anything short of throughout the year. If there is any
uncertainty in the decree in this respect, reference to
the findings of fact hereinbefore set out makes it dear
that Sharp was awarded all of the flow of water from
all of the springs during all of each and every year."
The two cases cited fully support the above quote from the
Utah Supreme Court.
In this case it is manifest that the primary issues were,

first, plaintiff's ownership of the entire flow of the Fairfield Springs, and, second, whether the springs and the
White wells were interconnected so that the pumping of
the wells would take water from the springs. These are
the issues raised by the pleadings. They are the issues resolved by the Court's Minute Entry and Ruling, and the
issues resolved by the Findings, Conclusions and Decree.
They were the issues raised on appeal to the Supreme
Court.
The plaintiffs prevailed on these issues, with the
Court finding in its Findings, and ruling in its Decree, that
the plaintiffs had appropriated, through usage prior to
1903 "all" of the waters of the Fairfield Springs. The
Court also found and decreed that the springs and the
White wells produced water from the same source, and
that the wells and the springs were immediately and directly interconnected, and that the production of water
from the White wells took water from the springs.
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Finding No. 26 is clear and unequivocal. It states
that defendant White should be enjoined from pumpin
his two large wells.
g
" ....a~ any time or during any season, except
upon cond1t1on that the water of the plaintiff's be
fully replaced with the same quality of water, with
the same quantity of water, and at the same point. .. "
It goes to say what the "replacement order" should re.
qull'e.
It is unreasonable to construe the replacement or.
der as modifying or amending the adjudication which the
court had made about the rights of the parties. The re·
placement order recognized the practical fact that if Mr.
White was pumping the replacement well, which is im.
mediately adjacent to the springs, and was pumping his
other large wells, which are interconnected with the
springs, it would be impossible to know what the springs
would naturally yield if all the wells were off. It takes an
average flow of about 4.4 c.f.s. to yield 1600 acre feet in
the 183 day irrigation season. There is nothing whatever
in the decree or in the findings even remotely to suggest
that Mr. White can so manipulate his wells to give us less
water in the critical growing months than the springs
would naturally yield. We think that the language of
Finding 26, which says that he is not to pump his well at
any time or during any season, unless he fully replaces
Fairfield's water, prohibits him from doing what he did in
May and June of 1969, even if the court should hold that
the replacement provision as to 1600 acre feet is in some
way a restriction on the quantity of water awarded to us.
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There is no sense, and there was no reason for a finding
that the spring flow varies from 4.1 to 6 c.f .s., if all we
could have is 4.1. There is no sense in or reason for a finding that 5 c.f.s. of water would yield 1800 acre feet, if in
all events our right was limited to 1600 acre feet.
When he isn't making any replacement at all, it is
res judicata that he takes our spring water when he pumps
his well. Where the measurements show that the spring
would be yielding at least 5 c.f.s. if he were not pumping,
he ought to replace day by day on that basis. It is much
more beneficial to us to have 5 c.f.s. in June, if nature will
produce it, than it is to have 4 c.f .s. in June and 6 c.f.s. in
October. Thus we assert that he must replace, in all
events, day by day, and acre foot by acre foot, as he takes
our water. We also assert that it was never intended by the
specific replacement provisions to subtract from, limit or
amend the express findings that we are the owners of and
that we have beneficially used all of the water from the
Fairfield Springs. The court should have adjudged that
the prior decree means what it said, to-wit, that we are the
owners of all of the water of the springs; that we are
entitled to have the water day by day, as nature would
produce it; that he cannot take our water in June and replace it in October; that he cannot have all of the water
from the springs in excess of 4.1 c.f .s. whenever he elects
to take it; and that he was not awarded the right to use all
of the water from the spring in excess of 1600 acre feet.
The evidence shows without contradiction, that he has
pumped his well hundreds of hours since 1967, without
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replacement. It is res judicata that he has taken our water
and without some further order from the court he will con.'
tinue to do so. The conclusionary finding that what he is
doing does not violate the decree is in error.
Respectfully submitted,
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